7_POLIKOFF_EIC (DO NOT DELETE)

8/8/2014 10:40 AM

FROM THIRD PARTIES TO PARENTS:
THE CASE OF LESBIAN COUPLES AND
THEIR CHILDREN
NANCY D. POLIKOFF*
I
INTRODUCTION
In his groundbreaking 1975 article, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial
1
Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, Robert Mnookin identified as the first
issue dominating academic discussion of child-custody law determining “how
much weight should be given to the interests of the natural parents in custody
2
disputes involving third parties.” He did not define either “natural parent” or
“third party,” presumably because he found the meaning of those terms selfevident; a natural parent was a biological parent and a third party was anyone
3
else. Two years earlier, the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) had defined the
parent and child relationship as “the legal relationship existing between a child
4
and his natural or adoptive parents.” The 1973 UPA also lacked a definition of
“natural,” but its usage throughout left little doubt that the drafters assumed
5
such a person was a child’s biological parent. There was no reason for Mnookin
to think the phrase lacked clarity or needed explication.
Instead, the term that captured much attention at the time, and that was
necessary to the core of Mnookin’s analysis, was the term “psychological
parent.” This term also dated to 1973, when it had been unveiled by Joseph
Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit in their paradigm-shifting book,
6
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child. The authors defined psychological
parent as the person “who, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through
interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child’s
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Wright, J.D., 2014, American University Washington College of Law, for her expert research and
editing assistance.
1. 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (Summer 1975).
2. Id. at 226.
3. Mnookin did, of course, acknowledge parentage acquired through adoption. “Adoption is the
legal process by which a child acquires parents other than his natural parents, and parents acquire a
child other than a natural child. The resulting legal relationship is identical to that of a natural parent
and child.” Id. at 244 n.85.
4. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 1 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 296 (1987).
5. See, e.g., id. § 3(1) (identifying a natural mother as the woman who gives birth to the child).
6. See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973).
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psychological needs for a parent, as well as the child’s physical needs.”
8
Mnookin accepted the importance of psychological parentage to children.
The general rule that a natural parent would prevail over a third party, he
argued, should give way in a factual situation in which the natural parent was
9
not the child’s psychological parent and a third party was. Then, the
10
psychological parent should prevail in a custody dispute.
Legal and cultural developments of the past almost forty years have made
the template Mnookin developed more complex. Use of assisted reproductive
technologies has separated genetics from parentage to a degree Mnookin could
not have predicted. The vast increase in the number of children born to
unmarried heterosexual couples has also complicated efforts to define
11
parentage. Mnookin’s model assumed a sharp and easily discernible line
between parents and third parties. That line is no longer sharp.
In this article I focus on disputes arising in one illustrative context. A lesbian
couple decides to bring a child into their relationship and to raise that child
together, with each of them acting as a parent. They have two options. They
may adopt, and, although some states allow a joint adoption by the couple, it is
common for only one partner to adopt the child. Or they may choose
insemination of one partner with donor semen. Usually, both partners select the
known donor or the characteristics of an unknown donor, and both participate
in the insemination and the prenatal process and birth. Whichever route they
select, they welcome the child into their family as two parents, and they raise
the child that way for some period of time. Then the couple separates. The child
may remain with the biological (or legally adoptive) mother, who permits
ongoing contact, even joint custody, by her ex-partner for a period of time.
Then, because the biological mother either cuts off contact completely or
reduces it dramatically, the nonbiological mother files in court for shared
custody or expanded visitation rights.
12
How do we identify the two parties in this dispute? The woman who gave
birth to the child is undeniably the child’s “natural parent.” In the earliest
disputes, courts identified the woman who did not bear the child as a third
13
party. She was, of course, a psychological parent, and over a decade into the
14
use of that term, advocates argued for her importance in the child’s life. But
7. Id. at 98.
8. Mnookin, supra note 1, at 282.
9. Id. at 282–83.
10. Id.
11. See Stephanie J. Ventura, Changing Patterns of Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States,
NCHS DATA BRIEF, May 2009, at 1, 1 (illustrating the rising trend of births to unmarried women).
12. If the couple has completed a second-parent adoption, they are both, of course, parents. The
analysis in this article is therefore unnecessary to resolve disputes over custody or visitation that arise
when such a couple separates.
13. See, e.g., In re Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (per curiam) (discussing
appellant’s visitation and custody options under a third-party legal regime).
14. These advocates often include national lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights
organizations. In In re Alison D., Alison D. was represented by Lamda Legal. In another third party–
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the argument that Mnookin developed for awarding custody to the
psychological parent depended upon the absence of the natural parent from the
15
child’s life. That was never the factual scenario in these cases. Nor was there
customarily a factual basis for arguing that the birth mother was unfit.
In part II of this article, I first describe the cases Mnookin used to illustrate
his approach to parent–third party disputes. I then describe the early lesbiancouple disputes on which this article focuses, demonstrating the challenge they
presented to the standard Mnookin advocated. In part III, I incorporate the
constitutional analysis required under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Troxel v.
16
Granville, a dispute over visitation rights between a mother and her children’s
paternal grandparents. I describe how the majority of courts that have applied
the case have found that it is not a barrier to claims by nonbiological mothers. I
also describe the minority view, which incorrectly sees no difference between
the grandparents in Troxel and a petitioning nonbiological mother in a lesbiancouple custody dispute. In part IV, I analyze evolving designations of
parentage, including the contemporary answer to the question Mnookin did not
ask: How to define the term “natural parent”? Finally, I conclude that to
preserve Mnookin’s values of family autonomy and continuous, stable
relationships, courts must correctly identify who is a child’s parent.
II
LESBIAN COUPLES RAISING CHILDREN DEFY THE PARENT–THIRD PARTY
BINARY
A. Mnookin’s Third-Party Cases
At the time of Mnookin’s article, the iconic custody dispute between a
17
parent and a third party was Painter v. Bannister. It is no surprise, therefore,
that Mnookin used it to illustrate his analytical framework. Painter v. Bannister
arose when a father, Harold Painter, sought return of his son, Mark, from the
18
child’s maternal grandparents. Harold embraced the San Francisco bay–area
19
counterculture of the 1960s. The grandparents, Dwight and Margaret
20
Bannister, were a stable, conventional Iowa farm couple. Harold sent Mark to
21
live with the Bannisters after Mark’s mother and sister died in a car accident.
Nine months later, when Harold sought Mark’s return, the Bannisters refused,

parent case, Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991), the National Center for
Lesbian Rights represented the biological mother’s lesbian partner.
15. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 282 (highlighting the harm that would come to a child if placed
with a natural parent whom the child viewed as a stranger).
16. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
17. 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966).
18. Id. at 153.
19. See id. at 154–56 (describing Harold’s lifestyle and general beliefs).
20. Id. at 154.
21. Id. at 153.
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and Harold turned to the Iowa courts.
The trial court ruled for the father, but the Iowa Supreme Court stayed
execution of that judgment and then reversed, granting custody to the
23
Bannisters. The opinion is replete with references to the “arty” and
“unconventional” life Mark would have with his father as contrasted to the
24
“stable” and “dependable” life he would have with his Iowa grandparents. The
court found that Mark was not well-adjusted when he came to his grandparents
25
and had greatly improved in their care. It also credited the opinion of an
expert witness who said that Mark considered his grandfather to be his father
26
figure and that his placement should not be disrupted. Although the court gave
27
lip service to the presumption in favor of a parent, it found the presumption
could be overcome if returning to the father was “likely to have a seriously
28
disrupting and disturbing effect upon the child’s development.”
29
Mnookin had no trouble determining that this ruling was wrong. He noted
that both the father and the grandparents had a “substantial psychological
30
relationship to the child.” Therefore, under his proposal, the father should
31
have prevailed.
The only other third party–parent dispute Mnookin used as illustration was
32
In re B.G., a case that turned on application of a new California statute
33
defining when courts could grant custody to third parties. The statute had been
34
enacted expressly “to avoid a Painter v. Bannister situation in California,” and
allowed a third-party custody award only when parental custody was found
35
“detrimental to the child.” The statute specifically did not require that the
parent be unfit, because its focus was not on the parent but on the issue of
36
detriment to the child.
In In re B.G., a mother from Czechoslovakia sought return of her two
37
children from their California foster parents. The children came to California
with their father, a political refugee who left Czechoslovakia with the children

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., id. at 154, 156 (labeling the child’s potential life with his father as “unstable,
unconventional, arty, Bohemian, and probably intellectually stimulating”).
25. Id. at 156.
26. Id. at 157.
27. See id. at 156 (noting the court’s sympathy for Harold’s situation).
28. Id.
29. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 283 (showing what should have happened in Painter).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 523 P.2d 244 (Cal. 1974) (en banc).
33. Mnookin, supra note 1, at 247.
34. In re B.G., 523 P.2d at 257 (internal citations omitted) (quoting legislative history).
35. Id. (citing legislative history).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 246.
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38

without their mother’s consent. The father eventually moved into his mother
39
and stepfather’s home in California, and a few months later he died. After
that, the children, ages five and six, went to live with the Smiths, neighbors who
40
had cared for the children while their father was at work. The Smiths became
licensed as foster parents, and the children lived with the Smiths for more than
41
two years before their mother’s petition to regain custody was heard in court.
The trial court found the mother to be a fit parent but found it in the children’s
42
best interests to remain with their foster parents and so awarded them custody.
The California Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, noting that
the trial judge had not made the statutorily mandated finding that an award of
custody to the mother would be “detrimental to the child,” and, further, that an
award to the foster parents was “required to serve the best interests of the
43
child.” The supreme court did conclude that the foster parents were “de facto
parents,” a term it defined using the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit definition of a
44
psychological parent. Mnookin considered this a case in which the foster
parents should have prevailed because the mother, who had not seen the
45
children in three and a half years, was a “psychological stranger” to them.
There are numerous factual distinctions between these two cases and the
lesbian-couple disputes that form the subject of this article. In both cases the
third parties claimed a deficiency in the parent–child relationship as a basis for
awarding them custody. The Bannisters claimed to be better able to raise
46
47
Mark; the Smiths argued they had replaced the children’s mother. Mnookin’s
opinion about the correct outcome for the two cases depended upon whether
the third party had supplanted the biological parent as the child’s psychological
parent. That question elided the definitional inquiry into the meaning of the
terms “third party” and “parent.”
B. Lesbian Couples with Children Split Up
When Mnookin was writing, there were certainly court cases involving
lesbian mothers. The cases, however, all concerned the placement of children
born in heterosexual marriages in which the mother had come out as lesbian in

38. Id.
39. Id. at 247.
40. Id. at 247 & 247 n.3.
41. Id. at 247–48. The mother had made prior efforts to secure the return of the children and had
not received notice of all the earlier court hearings involving the children’s placement with the Smiths.
Id. at 248.
42. Id. at 248–49.
43. Id. at 257–58.
44. Id. at 253 n.18, 254 (citing GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 6, at 98).
45. Mnookin, supra note 1, at 283.
46. See Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Iowa 1966) (highlighting the ability of the
Bannister’s to provide a “stable” and “dependable” life, as opposed to the “Bohemian” existence of the
natural father).
47. In re B.G., 523 P.2d at 254 (noting the Smith’s status as de facto parents).
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conjunction with the end of her marriage or at a later date. In some instances,
49
third-party relatives sought custody on the basis of the mother’s lesbianism. In
all of those cases, the lesbian mother was the child’s psychological parent and
50
the third-party relatives were not. Mnookin’s template would have strongly
favored the mothers, and it would have been a welcome corrective to courts
that were often quite willing to disregard the parent–child relationship when the
51
parent was a lesbian.
Mnookin could not have foreseen the type of custody dispute that would
arise between a biological mother and a nonbiological mother who had raised a
child together since infancy; the first known contested case involving such facts
52
occurred in 1984. The earliest cases need not be examined individually,
because two prominent early cases illustrate the factual circumstances common
53
to all such cases.
In Nancy S. v. Michele G., Michele and Nancy had been together for more
54
than ten years. In 1980, Nancy gave birth to a child, K., who was conceived
through donor insemination and planned by the couple together. Michele was
55
listed on the birth certificate as the father. Four years later, Nancy gave birth
56
to a son, S. Michele was again listed as the father on the birth certificate. Both
57
children were given Michele’s family name. Both children referred to both
58
women as “mom.”
When S. was an infant the couple separated and agreed that K. would live
59
with Michele and S. would live with Nancy. They arranged visitation so that
the children were together four days a week in one parent’s home. Three years
later, Nancy wanted to change the schedule so that each parent would have
both children fifty percent of the time. Michele disagreed.

48. See generally Nan D. Hunter & Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal
Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 691 (1976) (discussing a number of these cases).
49. See Chaffin v. Frye, 119 Cal. Rptr. 22, 23 (Ct. App. 1975); Bennett v. Clemens, 196 S.E.2d 842,
843 (Ga. 1973); Spence v. Durham, 198 S.E.2d 537, 541 (N.C. 1973); Commonwealth ex rel. Ashfield v.
Cortes, 234 A.2d 47, 48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967). See generally Hunter & Polikoff, supra note 48, at 705–11.
50. Chaffin, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 23; Bennett, 196 S.E.2d at 843; Spence, 198 S.E.2d at 542;
Commonwealth ex rel. Ashfield, 234 A.2d at 48. See generally Hunter & Polikoff, supra note 48, at 705–
711.
51. Mnookin, supra note 1, at 282–83.
52. See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 533–34
(1990) (recognizing a California case, Loftin v. Flournoy, No. 569630-7 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 1985), as
the first of this kind)
53. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 214 (Ct. App. 1991); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572
N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991) (per curiam).
54. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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At that point, Nancy filed a petition alleging that she was the sole parent of
60
both children and requesting sole legal and physical custody. Michele
responded by alleging that she, too, was a parent of the children. The trial court
ruled for Nancy, and the appeals court affirmed based on the fact that Michele
was not the children’s “natural” or adoptive mother, citing the state’s version of
61
the UPA.
Michele agreed that she was not the children’s natural mother, but she
62
alleged that the UPA was not the exclusive method of determining parentage.
63
She further alleged that she had the status of de facto parent. She specifically
asserted that she was the children’s psychological parent and that therefore she
should be able to seek custody and visitation on the same terms as any legally
64
recognized parent.
65
Michele also cited In re B.G., one of the two cases Mnookin had used to
66
demonstrate his principle about psychological parentage. That case relied on
the concept of de facto parent, but the court in Nancy S. noted that even if
Michele proved she was a de facto parent, she could not obtain custody without
67
showing that custody in Nancy would be detrimental to the children. This was
a fact Michele did not allege and could not have proven. The court also rejected
in loco parentis, equitable estoppel, and a definition of functional parenthood as
68
bases for awarding custody to Michele. In the end, the court deemed the
situation facing K. and S. “tragic,” but it rejected every argument Michele
69
proffered, preferring to leave any solution in the hands of the legislature.
Simultaneously, on the other side of the country, the case of In re Alison D.
70
v. Virginia M. was developing the same way. Alison and Virginia had been
living together for more than three years when Virginia gave birth to a child.
The couple had planned for the child together, and it was conceived through
71
72
donor insemination. Alison’s last name became the child’s middle name. The
couple split up when the child was almost two and a half years old, but for
almost three more years Alison had regular visitation with the child, until
73
Virginia terminated contact when the child was six. Alison petitioned for
74
visitation.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id. at 214–15, 219.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 215–16.
Id. at 216.
See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 283.
Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215–16.
See id. at 217–19 (precluding a parental determination under each of these theories).
Id. at 219.
572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991) (per curiam).
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 28–29.
Id. at 29.
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New York had not adopted the UPA. Its statute permitted “parents” to
76
initiate claims for custody and visitation. With “parent” undefined in the
statute, Alison argued that as a de facto parent or a parent by estoppel she
77
should have standing to pursue her claim. In a per curiam opinion, the New
York Court of Appeals rejected her arguments, citing Nancy S. v. Michele G. in
78
support of their ruling.
In both cases, advocates for Michele and Alison argued the theory of
psychological parentage that had animated Mnookin in his article. In this
context, however, the child did have another psychological parent who was also
79
what Mnookin would have called a “natural parent.” It appears that in such
circumstances, Mnookin would have favored granting custody to the “natural
80
parent.”
C. The Visitation-Rights Breakthrough and Its Later Impact on Custody
Disputes
The breakthrough case for nonbiological mothers in these families occurred
81
in Wisconsin in 1995. The facts of In re custody of H.S.H.-K. were familiar
enough. Sandra Holtzman and Elsbeth Knott met in 1983, and in 1984 they
82
“solemnized their commitment to each other.” They decided to have a child
together through insemination with an anonymous donor, and in 1988 Knott
83
gave birth to a child. Holtzman was present and took three weeks off from
work. The couple named the child together, and both women were named as
84
the child’s parents at a church ceremony. Holtzman’s parents were recognized
85
86
as the child’s grandparents. The couple raised the child as two parents. In
1993, Knott moved out with the child, and the next year she terminated all

75. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 2010).
76. Id.; see also Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29.
77. Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29.
78. Id. (citing Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991)).
79. See, e.g., Mnookin, supra note 1, at 226 (noting the use of the best-interests standard to reject
certain claims by a natural parent).
80. See id. at 282–83 (“[N]atural parents should be preferred over others.”). Alison was seeking
only visitation rights and Michele would have preferred visitation rights to complete exclusion from her
children’s lives. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214; Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28. Mnookin was silent on
visitation rights for a psychological parent. See generally Mnookin, supra note 1. In fact, he did not
discuss visitation rights at all in the article. Perhaps the most controversial recommendation made by
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, and one never adopted into law, was that a child be accorded one
omnipotent parent who would even have the power to deny the other parent visitation rights with the
child. GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 6, at 38. Given the importance of Goldstein, Freud,
and Solnit’s theories to Mnookin’s article, it would have been hard for him to discuss visitation without
addressing that recommendation.
81. In re Custody of H.S.H-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
82. Id. at 421.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 421–22.
85. Id. at 422.
86. Id.
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contact between the child and Holtzman. Holtzman petitioned for custody and
visitation.
The court developed a four-part test for evaluating a claim by a person in
Holtzman’s situation that she was entitled to a continued relationship with a
87
child. In addition, it permitted a person meeting this test to bring a court
action only when two triggering circumstances existed. The four-prong test was
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the petitioner’s
formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child; (2) that the
petitioner and the child lived together in the same household; (3) that the petitioner
assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child’s
care, education and development, including contributing towards the child’s support,
without expectation of financial compensation; and (4) that the petitioner has been in
a parental role for a length of time sufficient to88have established with the child a
bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.

The triggering circumstances that would allow the individual to bring a court
action were “that this parent has interfered substantially with the petitioner’s
parent-like relationship with the child, and that the petitioner sought court
89
ordered visitation within a reasonable time after the parent’s interference.”
Advocates for lesbian and gay families greeted H.S.H.-K. with acclaim and
relief, but the case was not a clear victory. By meeting all the established
criteria, a woman would be able to maintain a relationship with the child she
90
had planned for and raised, but only through visitation. She was still a third
91
92
party. She was simply in a class of third parties entitled to visitation rights.
Still, after the total defeat in Nancy S. and Alison D., visitation rights looked
93
good indeed.
The H.S.H-.K. criteria had a significant impact on subsequent cases. In 2000,
in V.C. v. M.J.B., the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the test and went
farther than Wisconsin in establishing the consequences of meeting all the
94
criteria. A person meeting such criteria would stand in parity to a legal parent
95
for determinations of custody and visitation. Five years later, in In re
87. Id. at 421.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 424 (affirming summary judgment on the custody issue).
91. Id. at 430 (discussing visitation of a third party).
92. See id. at 436 (remanding the determination of Holtzman’s parent-like relationship with the
child).
93. See Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 215 (Ct. App. 1991); In re Alison D. v. Virginia
M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (per curiam).
94. 748 A.2d 539, 551–52 (N.J. 2000) (per curiam).
95. Id. at 554. The court did say that if the evidence stood “in equipoise,” custody should be
awarded to the legal parent because “in the search for self-knowledge, the child's interest in his or her
roots will emerge.” Id. This peculiar reasoning has not made its way into subsequent decisions, perhaps
because the evidence of a child’s best interests is rarely in equipoise. (The reasoning is peculiar because
if the legal parent is an adoptive rather than a biological parent there is no difference between the
parents when it comes to the child’s “roots.” In addition, even when the legal parent is a biological
parent, that parent will receive visitation rights that should be sufficient to satisfy the child’s speculative
desire to connect to hir or her to biological roots.)
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96

Parentage of L.B., Washington adopted the H.S.H.-K. test as a common-law
97
method of determining parentage. The court deemed such a person a de facto
parent and also found that such a person stood “in legal parity” to someone
98
declared a parent under the state’s version of the UPA.
III
THE IMPACT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. The Supreme Court Speaks: Troxel v. Granville
A reader of Mnookin’s 1975 article cannot help but be struck by its omission
99
of constitutional doctrine. In the analyses of disputes between parents and
third parties, Mnookin did prefer parents, but without declaring such a rule
100
constitutionally mandated. The biological mothers in H.S.H.-K, V.C., and
L.B. all petitioned for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, requesting reversal
of state courts’ rulings on the ground that those rulings violated a parent’s right
101
102
to raise her child. The Court denied the petitions. While V.C.’s petition was
pending, however, the Supreme Court did address the rights of parents when
103
challenged by third parties in Troxel v. Granville, a case that has shaped all
subsequent disputes.
By now, the facts of Troxel are well-known. After Brad Troxel, father of two
daughters, took his own life, Brad’s parents objected to the minimal visitation
104
the children’s mother, Tommie Granville, wished to accord them. They sued
for more frequent contact with the children under a Washington statute that
allowed “any person” at “any time” to petition for visitation rights and obtain
105
such rights under a best-interests standard. The trial court awarded the
106
Troxels one weekend a month with the children and one week in the summer.
The court reasoned that the contact would allow the children to benefit from
107
“cousins and music.” The judge also expounded from the bench that he had

96. 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005) (en banc).
97. See id. at 165, 176.
98. Id. at 177. The court ruled that the state’s version of the UPA was not the only way to
determine parentage. Id. In other words, the Washington Supreme Court adopted the very reasoning
argued by Michele G. in California: that the UPA was not an exclusive method of proving parentage.
See supra text accompanying notes 62–64.
99. See generally Mnookin, supra note 1.
100. See id. at 282–83.
101. M.J.B. v. V.C., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926 (2000); In re Parentage of
L.B., 122 P.3d 161, cert denied sub nom. Britain v. Carvin, 547 U.S. 1143 (2006); In re Custody of
H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Knott v. Holtzman, 516 U.S. 975 (1995).
102. See sources cited supra note 101.
103. 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion).
104. Id. at 60–61.
105. Id. at 61 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160 (2005)).
106. Id. The court also awarded four hours of visitation on each grandparent’s birthday. Id.
107. Id. at 62.

7_POLIKOFF_EIC (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1 2014]

8/8/2014 10:40 AM

LESBIAN COUPLES AS PARENTS

205
108

greatly enjoyed spending summers as a child with his own grandparents.
The Washington Supreme Court, on appeal, found the statute
109
unconstitutional on its face. The court held that a third party could not receive
visitation rights over the objection of a fit parent absent evidence that the
110
children would be harmed by a denial of visitation. The Troxels petitioned the
111
U.S. Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
No majority opinion emerged in the case. A plurality agreed that the statute
was unconstitutional as applied to Tommie Granville, but declined to affirm the
Washington Supreme Court’s two-part holding, on grounds that either the
statute was unconstitutional on its face or that harm was necessary before a
112
third party could be granted visitation rights over a fit parent’s objection.
Instead, the Court criticized the “breathtakingly broad” nature of the statute
because it allowed anyone at any time to file for visitation and allowed a trial
judge to order such visitation upon satisfaction of a mere best-interests
standard, a standard that allowed a judge to inappropriately substitute his or
113
her opinion for that of the child’s parent. The Washington statute, the
plurality ruled, allowed the decision of a fit parent to be overruled without
giving “special weight” to that decision and without the presence of “special
factors” that might justify such an intrusion into a parent’s due-process liberty
114
interest in raising his or her child.
The six-person majority for affirming the judgment of the Washington
Supreme Court included Justice Thomas, who believed the statute failed strict
115
scrutiny, and Justice Souter, who thought the best approach was affirming the
state court’s holding of facial unconstitutionality and leaving it to the
116
Washington legislature to craft a better statute.
Justices Stevens and Kennedy wrote separate dissents. Justice Stevens
acknowledged that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in “caring for
117
and guiding their children,” and noted that “the presumption that parental
118
decisions generally serve the best interests of their children is sound.” He
nonetheless focused on separate rights that a child might have, noting that even
108. See id. at 72 (“I look back on some personal experiences . . . . We always spen[t] as kids a week
with one set of grandparents and another set of grandparents, [and] it happened to work out in our
family that [it] turned out to be an enjoyable experience. Maybe that can, in this family, if that is how it
works out.”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Id. at 63.
110. Id.
111. In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21 (Wash. 1998), cert. granted, 527 U.S. 1069 (1999).
112. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73.
113. Id. at 67.
114. Id.at 68–69.
115. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
116. See id. at 76, 79 (Souter, J., concurring) (“I do not question the power of a State’s highest court
to construe its domestic statute and to apply a demanding standard when ruling on its facial
constitutionality.”).
117. Id. at 87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 86.
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a fit parent might treat a child as a “mere possession,” and invoking Court
precedent to reject the suggestion that parental rights might turn children into
120
“so much chattel.”
Justice Stevens rejected the Washington Supreme Court’s holding that the
statute, because it failed to require harm to the child before visitation could be
121
granted over a parent’s objection, was unconstitutional on its face. He
reasoned that
[u]nder the Washington statute, there are plainly any number of cases—indeed, one
suspects, the most common to arise—in which the “person” among “any” seeking
visitation is a once-custodial caregiver, an intimate relation, or even a genetic parent.
Even the Court would seem to agree that in many circumstances, it would be
constitutionally permissible for a court to award some visitation of a child to a parent
or previous caregiver in cases of parental separation or divorce, cases of disputed
122
custody, cases involving temporary foster care or guardianship, and so forth.

He also articulated a “child’s liberty interests in preserving established familial
123
or family-like bonds,” and he referred to “[t]he almost infinite variety of
family relationships that pervade our ever-changing society” as a reason not to
treat a parent’s liberty interest as something that could be “exercised
124
arbitrarily.”
Justice Kennedy also invoked changing family structures to describe why the
Washington Supreme Court was wrong, and why a best-interests standard
would sometimes be constitutionally permissible. “Cases are sure to arise,” he
wrote, “perhaps a substantial number of cases—in which a third party, by acting
in a caregiving role over a significant period of time, has developed a
relationship with a child which is not necessarily subject to absolute parental
125
veto.” He continued,
In my view, it would be more appropriate to conclude that the constitutionality of the
application of the best interests standard depends on more specific factors. In short, a
fit parent’s right vis-a-vis a complete stranger
is one thing; her right vis-a-vis another
126
parent or a de facto parent may be another.

The reasoning of both the Stevens and the Kennedy dissents supports the
constitutionality of maintaining contact between a child and her nonbiological
lesbian mother in the scenarios presented in this article.
In the years since Troxel, state courts have split sharply over the case’s
application to third-party custody and visitation disputes. In spite of the
plurality’s explicit rejection of the harm standard, some state courts have held
third-party visitation statutes unconstitutional in the absence of requiring harm

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 85.
Id.
Id. at 88.
Id.
Id. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 100.
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from a denial of visitation. And although Troxel held only that the
Washington statute was unconstitutional as applied to the facts of that case,
several states subsequently held their third-party visitation statutes to be invalid
128
on their face. Numerous other state courts, however, have upheld the statutes
129
in their respective states. Of course, even when a statute is constitutional, its
application in each case must satisfy a state appellate court’s interpretation of
Troxel’s mandate.
B. Lesbian-Couple Custody Disputes After Troxel
Troxel increased the stakes in determining who qualified as a child’s parent.
130
Alison D. and Michele G. argued that they were parents and lost. Holtzman
argued she was a parent and lost that determination, but she was found eligible
for visitation rights if she met the detailed criteria set out by the Wisconsin
131
Supreme Court. The Wisconsin standard was far from the “any person at any
time” standard struck down in Troxel: It incorporated the very “special factors”
132
that the Troxel plurality found unmet on the facts of that case. When the New
Jersey Supreme Court used the Wisconsin standard as the basis for finding that
a nonbiological lesbian mother stood in legal parity with the child’s biological
mother, it was unsurprising that, shortly after ruling in Troxel, the U.S. Supreme
133
Court denied the biological mother’s petition for certiorari.
More than a decade after Troxel, most courts have found that the case does
not bar claims by nonbiological lesbian mothers. In an early case, Rubano v.
134
DiCenzo, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that Troxel did not give a
parent an absolute right to arbitrarily terminate a de facto parental relationship
135
that the parent had agreed to and fostered for many years. In Bethany v.
136
Jones, the Arkansas Supreme Court distinguished claimants standing in loco
parentis to a child, like the lesbian nonbiological mother in that case, from the
127. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 172 P.3d 1067, 1080 (Haw. 2007) (“[W]e believe that a ‘harm to the child’
standard is constitutionally required . . . .”).
128. See Sonya C. Garza, The Troxel Aftermath: A Proposed Solution for State Courts and
Legislatures, 69 LA. L. REV 927, 940–41 n.101 (2009) (listing numerous cases holding their
corresponding states’ visitation statutes facially unconstitutional).
129. See Garza, supra note 128, at 940 n.100.
130. See Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 216, 219 (Ct. App. 1991); In re Alison D. v.
Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991) (per curiam) (“[A]lthough petitioner apparently nurtured a
close and loving relationship with the child, she is not a parent . . . .”).
131. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (remanding the determination of
whether Holtzman’s qualified for visitation).
132. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000) (plurality opinion) (finding no special factors to
justify the state’s interference with the mother’s fundamental right to raise her children); H.S.H.-K., 533
N.W.2d at 421.
133. See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 554 (N.J. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926 (2000) (denying
certiorari four months after the Troxel decision).
134. 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000).
135. Id. at 976. For an in-depth discussion of this case see Nancy D. Polikoff, The Impact of Troxel
v. Granville on Lesbian and Gay Parents, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 825, 835–38 (2001).
136. 378 S.W.3d 731 (Ark. 2011).
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grandparents in Troxel. In Kulstad v. Maniaci, the Montana Supreme Court
upheld despite a Troxel-based challenge a statute that allowed a woman who
was not the legally adoptive parent of the child she and her partner had raised
together to obtain custody or visitation by showing (1) that she had established
a child–parent relationship and (2) that the child’s parent had acted contrary to
139
her child–parent relationship. The supreme courts of both Kentucky and
North Carolina have held that a parent can waive her superior right to custody
by acting inconsistently with her paramount parental status and creating
140
another parent figure for the child. It is worth observing that such holdings
have come from courts in several states not generally supportive of lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) families.
A minority of states, however, have denied a functional psychological parent
without legal status the ability to request custody or visitation rights. Although
more often such courts have ruled on state-statutory or common-law grounds,
141
some have also cited Troxel as a barrier. The Maryland Court of Appeals
denied a de facto parent the ability to remain in the life of her child, citing
extensively from Troxel, but leaving the door open for the possibility that the
legislature might constitutionally amend its custody laws to allow such a person
142
to petition for custody or visitation. Most significantly, in 2010, in Debra H. v.
143
Janice R., the New York Court of Appeals upheld its reasoning in Alison D.,
citing the legislature’s failure to amend its custody statutes in the many years
144
since that ruling. The court also cited Troxel in support of Janice’s
145
fundamental right to raise her child.
The New York court reasoned that this constitutional right would be
threatened by uncertainty if a person could pursue custody or visitation rights
146
based on a test for functional parenthood. Debra had argued that the
Wisconsin factors constituted an appropriate method for determining functional
147
or de facto parentage. The court responded that
the flexible type of rule championed by [Debra] H. threatens to trap single biological
and adoptive parents and their children in a limbo of doubt. These parents could not
possibly know for sure when another adult’s level of involvement in family life might
reach the tipping point and jeopardize their right to bring up their children without the
137. Id. at 736.
138. 220 P.3d 595 (Mont. 2009).
139. Id. at 607, 609–10.
140. Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 579, 581 (Ky. 2010); Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d
494, 505, 550–51 (N.C. 2010).
141. For a listing, see Carlos A. Ball, Rendering Children Illegitimate in Former Partner Parenting
Cases: Hiding Behind the Façade of Certainty, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 623, 624 n.4
(2012).
142. Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 74, 89 (Md. 2008).
143. 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010).
144. Id. at 194 (pointing out that the legislature did not amend N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70
(McKinney 2010) after Alison D. was handed down).
145. Id. at 193 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 192 n.3.
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148

The court also wished to avoid the “contentious, costly, and lengthy” hearings
149
that such a rule might produce. Instead the court ruled that a nonbiological
mother is a parent, and she is thereby entitled to custody or visitation only if she
has adopted the child or if she and the biological mother were married or in a
150
civil union at the time of the child’s birth.
IV
THE EVOLVING DEFINITIONS OF PARENT
A. Assisted Reproduction and Changing Family Structures
Social changes Mnookin could not have anticipated have led to numerous
disputes about child custody that have challenged courts to identify the
relationship between a child and an individual claiming to be, or not to be, that
151
child’s parent. In this part I look at those changes. I then examine the case law
and statutory responses to those changes and describe the evolution of the
meaning of “natural parent,” the term Mnookin and the drafters of the 1973
UPA found unnecessary to define.
Most contemporary methods of assisted conception, including surrogacy and
152
in vitro fertilization, did not exist in 1975, and they increased the number of
parents not genetically related to their children. Although the 1973 UPA
established the parentage of a husband who consented to his wife’s
153
insemination with donor semen under the supervision of a physician —
148. Id. at 193.
149. Id. at 192. For a scathing critique of the New York court’s assumption that the test established
in H.S.H.-K. produced uncertainty when contrasted with New York’s approach, see Ball, supra note
141. Although Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Troxel also noted the disruption and cost that contested
litigation could bring, he nonetheless suggested that a parent might not be able to veto a claim by a
person who had cared for a child for a substantial period and thereby developed a relationship with the
child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 98, 101 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see supra text
accompanying notes 125–126.
150. Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 191–92, 195, 197. In a subsequent case, a trial court identified another
basis on which a nonbiological mother might prevail, ruling that a biological mother who had
previously obtained a child-support order against her former partner in an action in which she
identified her ex-partner as a parent of their child could not later invoke Debra H. to block the former
partner’s petition for custody. Estrelitta A. v. Jennifer D., 963 N.Y.S.2d 843, 847 (Fam. Ct. 2013). For a
critique of making the parents’ formal relationship status, such as marriage or civil union, the dividing
line between children with two parents and children with one parent, see Nancy D. Polikoff, The New
Illegitimacy: Winning Backward in the Protection of the Children of Lesbian Couples, 20 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 721 (2012).
151. See generally Mnookin, supra note 1 (omitting a discussion of a scenario where an individual
poses as a child’s natural parent).
152. See Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to Technological Change: The
Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 505, 509 (2005) (dating the birth of the
“world’s first [in vitro fertilization] baby,” Louise Brown, as July 25, 1978). The first known legal
agreement between a surrogate mother and intended parents took place in 1976. History of Surrogacy,
INFO. ON SURROGACY, http://www.information-on-surrogacy.com/history-of-surrogacy.html (last
visited Apr. 16, 2013).
153. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a) (1973), 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987).
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something that had been unsettled before that time —it was silent on
permutations of that practice: insemination with semen from a known donor,
self-insemination with semen purchased directly from a sperm bank, and
insemination of an unmarried single woman or an unmarried woman with a
male or female partner. The 1973 UPA separated genetics from parentage by
declaring that a donor of semen under the delineated situation was not a
155
parent, but it did not address the parental status of a donor under any other
scenario. The possibility of a husband and wife commissioning the birth of a
child, conceived through sperm and egg from unknown donors, fertilized
through in vitro fertilization, with the resulting embryo implanted in the uterus
of yet another woman—and the legal disputes such an arrangement could
156
produce —would have seemed like science fiction in 1975.
Simultaneously, sexual practices and the composition of American families
shifted. The percentage of married women engaging in extramarital sex
157
increased, thereby increasing the chance a mother’s husband was not the
genetic father of her child. Also, the number of cohabiting heterosexual couples
158
skyrocketed. Without the marital presumption tying a man to a child born to
his unmarried female partner, his status was uncertain, especially when she
conceived through assisted conception or through sexual intercourse with a
different man. Science also entered the picture by perfecting the ability to
determine whether a given man or woman was the genetic parent of any
159
particular child.
Mnookin also could not have imagined the phenomenon of same-sex
couples raising children, conceived through numerous methods: donor
insemination of one woman in the female couple, in vitro fertilization of one
woman’s egg with donor semen followed by implementing into the uterus of the
154. See id. § 5 cmt. (“It was thought useful . . . to single out and cover in this Act at least one fact
situation that occurs frequently.”). For an example of a pre-UPA case finding a child born of artificial
insemination illegitimate, see Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
155. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (1973), 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987).
156. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 280, 286 (Ct. App. 1998) (discussing the
implications of such a fact pattern).
157. See Tara Parker-Pope, Love, Sex and the Changing Landscape of Infidelity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
28, 2008, at D1 (discussing the apparent increase in female infidelity and extramarital affairs). In 2011,
an Indiana University Kinsey Institute for Research in Sex, Gender, and Reproduction study found an
increase to nineteen percent of women participating in extramarital affairs. Insight Into Infidelity: Study
Examines Influence of Sexual Personality Characteristics, IND. U., http://newsinfo.iu.edu/newsarchive/18977.html (last modified June 24, 2011). That number put women almost on par with the
twenty-three percent of men who were found to engage in extramarital affairs. Id.
158. In 1970, there were 523,000 unmarried heterosexual couples living together. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS P20-365, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS 5 tbl.F (1980). By 1977 there were 957,000. Id. In 2012, the number of unmarried
heterosexual couples living together had jumped to 7,845,000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S
FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2012, at 20 tbl.7 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2013pubs/p20-570.pdf.
159. See History of Paternity Testing, GENESYS, http://www.paternity-answers.com/historypaternity-test.html#1980 (last visited Nov. 5, 2013) (recognizing the increase in accuracy of paternity
testing in the 1970s to 80% and in the 1980s to 99.99%).
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other woman for gestation and birth, sexual intercourse of one female partner
with a man—with or without the knowledge and consent of the other female
partner, or gay male couples using traditional and gestational surrogates. Nor
could he have contemplated that within two generations 46.44% of the U.S.
160
161
adult population and 49.58% of adult gay people would live in a state
offering formal recognition of gay relationships, including the parentage
presumption flowing from marriage.
B. Statutes and Court Rulings Adapt to Assisted Reproductive Technologies
and Changed Family Demographics
Both courts and legislatures have responded to the social changes described
above. As discussed in part II, some state courts, through common-law
adjudication, identified de facto parents and gave such persons an equal claim
162
to custody of a child. Other states enacted statutes producing the same
163
result, and the ALI recommended one such approach in the definition of
160. To deduce this number I divided the adult population of states that have couple recognition
(111,561,028) by the total adult population of the United States (240,185,952). See LGBT Populations,
MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/lgbt_populations (select
“State Data Table” tab) (last updated May 15, 2014). Couple-recognition states are those with full
marriage equality or those with broad relationship-recognition laws. See States, FREEDOM TO MARRY,
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/ (last updated June 17, 2014).
161. To deduce this number I divided the total number of LGBT adults in the couple-recognition
states (4,196,185) by the total number of LGBT adults in all states (8,463,640). See sources cited supra
note 160.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 94–98.
163. For example, after the Delaware Supreme Court ruled against a legally unrecognized mother
because she could not meet the definitions in the state’s UPA, see Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 16
(Del. 2009), the Delaware legislature amended its UPA. See 77 Del. Laws 282 (2010). A statutory path
to parentage as a de facto parent is available in Delaware to a person who can show that he or she
(1) Has had the support and consent of the child's parent or parents who fostered the
formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship between the child and the de facto
parent;
(2) Has exercised parental responsibility for the child as that term is defined in § 1101 of this
title; and
(3) Has acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established a bonded
and dependent relationship with the child that is parental in nature.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (2009). In the District of Columbia, a de facto parent is a person
(A) Who:
(i) Lived with the child in the same household at the time of the child's birth or adoption
by the child's parent;
(ii) Has taken on full and permanent responsibilities as the child's parent; and
(iii) Has held himself or herself out as the child's parent with the agreement of the child's
parent or, if there are 2 parents, both parents; or
(B) Who:
(i) Has lived with the child in the same household for at least 10 of the 12 months
immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or motion for custody;
(ii) Has formed a strong emotional bond with the child with the encouragement and
intent of the child's parent that a parent-child relationship form between the child and the
third party;
(iii) Has taken on full and permanent responsibilities as the child's parent; and
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parent by estoppel given in Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution.
165
and the American Bar
Model acts, including the revised 2002 UPA
166
Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technologies,
addressed parentage of children conceived through assisted reproductive
technologies. Four jurisdictions, the District of Columbia, Nevada, New
Mexico, and Washington, passed gender-neutral and marital status–neutral
statutes creating parentage in an individual who consents to a woman’s
insemination with donor semen with the intent to be a parent of the child so
167
conceived. These statutes are the logical outgrowth of the 1973 UPA. What
applied only to married couples in 1973 needed to expand to the unmarried
different-sex couples and same-sex couples that were not on the radar screen at
that time.
At the same time that common-law theories and newly enacted statutes
were altering the legal-parentage landscape, a remarkable evolution occurred in
the definition of the term neither Mnookin nor the 1973 UPA had thought to
168
169
define: natural parent. It happened first in In re Nicholas H., a California
case involving a heterosexual couple.
The original UPA, as adopted in California, created a presumption of
parentage for a man who received a child into his home and openly held the
170
child out as his natural child. It was a presumption, like all the UPA paternity
171
presumptions, that could be rebutted. Although the term natural child was
undefined, the common assumption that it meant biological child was consistent
172
with references going back to Blackstone.

(iv) Has held himself or herself out as the child's parent with the agreement of the child's
parent, or if there are 2 parents, both parents.
D.C. CODE 16-831.01(1) (2013). A person who proves the above by clear and convincing evidence is a
parent for purposes of determining custody, visitation, and child support. D.C. CODE 16-831.03(b)
(2013).
164. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
2.03(1)(b) (2002).
165. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 4 (Supp. 2010).
166. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. §§ 601–607 (2008).
167. D.C. CODE § 16-909(e) (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-703 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE §
26.26.710 (2005). In addition, an Oregon appeals court ruled, on a constitutional equal-protection
theory, that the state’s statute creating parentage for a husband consenting to his wife’s insemination
must apply equally to a woman who consents to her partner’s insemination with the intent to be a
parent of the resulting child. Shineovich v. Kemp, 214 P.3d 29, 39–40 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
168. See generally UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) § 1, 9B U.L.A. 296 (1987) (defining “parent and
child relationship” but not “natural parent,” a term used in the definition of “parent and child
relationship”); Mnookin, supra note 1 (also omitting a definition of “natural parent”).
169. 46 P.3d 932, 935 (Cal. 2002); see infra text accompanying notes 173–190.
170. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2013) (“A man is presumed to be the natural father of a
child if . . . [h]e receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child.”).
171. See id. § 7612 (exploring the ways to rebut the paternal presumption).
172. Historically and at common law, blood relation was the primary means of establishing the legal
status of a natural parent. Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 762 (Ohio C.P. Summit County 1994) (citing
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *434. The first adoption statute in the United States was
enacted in 1851 in Massachusetts. 1851 Mass. Acts 815. It stripped the “natural parent or parents” of all
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In In re Nicholas H., Thomas and Kimberly met when Kimberly was already
173
pregnant. Both decided that they wanted Thomas to be the child’s father, and,
when Nicholas was born in 1995, Thomas’s name was placed on the birth
174
certificate as the father’s. The couple never married, but they lived together
with Nicholas intermittently, and Thomas consistently functioned as a father to
175
Nicholas.
The relationship between Thomas and Kimberly ended in
September of 1999, resulting in Thomas moving out, and Kimberly being unable
176
to properly supervise and protect Nicholas. In early 2000, Thomas filed a
petition to establish a parental relationship with Nicholas and to receive
temporary custody, alleging, among other things, that Kimberly was in jail for
177
assaulting him.
Kimberly subsequently went to the police to report that Thomas had taken
Nicholas without her permission, and she showed them a copy of a 1998
178
restraining order against Thomas. Eventually, the police took Nicholas into
179
custody, and dependency proceedings were instituted. The juvenile court
found that Nicholas could not remain with Kimberly as a result of her
180
instability, drug use, homelessness, lack of employment, and violence.
Although acknowledging that Thomas had problems, the court found that he
was caring and responsible toward Nicholas and that Nicholas loved him and
181
wanted to live with him. The court also found that the presumption that
182
Thomas was Nicholas’s father was not rebutted.
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Thomas’s admission that he
183
was not Nicholas’s biological father rebutted the parentage presumption. That
court reviewed numerous decisions that assumed the term “natural” meant
184
“biological.”
The California Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed the
185
appeals court. It cited statutory language that a parentage presumption “may
186
be rebutted in an appropriate action.” This, the court said, made rebutting the
legal rights to the child. Id. § 7, at 816. Once again, the term “natural parent” was not defined, but the
statute did confer “all other legal consequences and incidents of the natural relation of parents and
children, the same to all intents and purposes as if such child had been born in lawful wedlock of such
parents or parent by adoption” to the adoptive parents. Id. § 6.
173. In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d at 935.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 934.
177. Id. at 935.
178. Id. at 934.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 935.
181. Id. at 936.
182. Id. at 934.
183. Id. at 936.
184. Id. (noting that the court of appeals reviewed family-law decisions that “assumed that natural
means biological”).
185. Id. at 941.
186. Id. at 936.
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presumption based on lack of biological connection discretionary, not
187
mandatory. The court also quoted the portion of the statute asserting that if
there were two or more conflicting presumptions, “the presumption which on
188
the facts is founded on weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.”
If the legislature intended the presumption of paternity to be inapplicable to a
man who is not a biological father, the court reasoned, it would not have
189
provided for such weighing. Neither would the legislature have intended that
an appropriate action for rebutting the presumption would be one that would
190
leave the child with no father. Thus “natural father” and “natural child” did
not, in fact, require a biological connection.
California had also enacted another provision of the 1973 UPA, stating that
the rules for determining paternity apply to determinations of maternity
191
“[i]nsofar as practicable.” Almost immediately after Nicholas H., a California
appeals court had occasion to consider the meaning of that provision. In In re
192
Karen C., a birth mother who bore a child in a hospital purposefully
misidentified herself as another woman—Letitia C.—so that Letitia’s name
would appear on the child’s birth certificate and Letitia would therefore be able
193
to raise the child (the Karen in the case). Letitia raised Karen as her own child
194
and told Karen she was adopted.
When Karen was ten years old she came into the dependency system as a
195
result of allegations of abuse by Letitia. Karen and Letitia joined in a motion
for a determination that Letitia was Karen’s mother, a finding that would
ensure that Letitia receive services that could lead to her reunification with
196
Karen. They argued that the fact that Letitia had received Karen into her
home and held Karen out as her natural child, coupled with the provision
applying father–child provisions to maternity actions, made Letitia a
197
presumptive parent. The trial court denied the motion, but the appeals court
reversed and remanded in light of the California Supreme Court’s ruling in
198
Nicholas H. Because Nicholas H. held that “a man does not lose his status as a
presumed father by admitting he is not the biological father,” the court held
199
that Letitia also did not lose that status. On remand, the trial court would
need to determine whether, in the circumstances of the case, it was appropriate

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id. at 937 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612 (West 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 940.
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650(a) (West 2013).
124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 678.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 677 (citing In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932, 938 (Cal. 2002)).
Id. at 681 (citing In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d at 938).
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200

to rebut the presumption.
Just a year later, a California appeals court squarely applied the father–child
201
holding-out presumption to a determination of maternity. In re Salvador M.
considered the relationship between a child and his adult half sister, Monica.
When Salvador was born, Monica had a baby of her own, and she breast fed
202
Salvador when their (common) mother was unable. When Salvador was three,
his mother died, and Monica continued to raise him as her son, along with yet
203
another child she gave birth to.
When all three children came into California’s dependency system, Monica
204
filed a petition to determine her maternity of Salvador. The social worker
205
reported that Salvador believed Monica was his mother. Monica presented
the following facts:
Our mother died at the scene of an explosive car crash when Salvador was three. I
have continued to care for Salvador as my child. He thinks of me as his mother and I
think of him as my son. Our family knows of the actual relationship between Salvador
and me and I have been truthful in official matters such as school registration, but to
206
the rest of the world, Salvador is my son.

She argued that the holding-out provision of the California UPA, coupled
with the provision for establishing maternity on the same bases as paternity,
207
made her Salvador’s presumptive parent. The court agreed, citing In re Karen
208
C.. Then she cited Nicholas H. for the proposition that the fact that she was
209
not Salvador’s genetic parent did not automatically rebut that presumption.
The court again agreed, and it further declared that it would not be appropriate
to rebut the presumption because “to sever this deeply rooted mother/child
bond would contravene the state’s interest in maintaining the family
210
relationship.”
With these three cases as precedent, in 2005 the California Supreme Court,
211
in Elisa B. v. Superior Court, extended the presumption of parentage to a
lesbian who had received two children born to her female partner into her
212
home and held the children out as her natural children. Nicholas H. had held
that biology did not automatically rebut a presumption based on the holding-

200. Id. at 682.
201. 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705 (Ct. App. 2003).
202. Id. at 706.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 707.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 707.
207. Id. at 707–08 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2013); In re Karen C., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d
677, 677 (Ct. App. 2002)).
208. Id. at 708 (citing In re Karen C., 124 Cal. Rptr. at 677).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 709.
211. 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005).
212. Id. at 662.
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213

out provision of the UPA. Karen C. had held the presumption applicable to
214
determinations of the mother–child relationship. The court found the facts of
this case did not present an “appropriate action” upon which to rebut Elisa’s
presumed parentage because she “actively consented to, and participated in, the
artificial insemination of her partner with the understanding that the resulting
child or children would be raised by Emily and her as coparents, and they did
215
act as coparents for a substantial period of time.” In addition, rebutting the
presumption would leave the children with only one parent “as a source of both
216
emotional and financial support.”
More than fifteen years after the California courts had begun considering
(eventually rejecting) Michele G.’s claim that she was the parent of the two
children she raised with her former partner, it turned out that the theory
217
supporting her parentage had been, the entire time, hiding in plain sight. The
relevant statutes had not changed. But in 1991 it had been “undisputed,” even
by the most creative and determined advocates for LGBT families, that Michele
218
G. was not the “natural mother” of her children.
219
220
221
Courts in Colorado, New Mexico, and, most recently, Kansas, have
found in the context of disputes by former lesbian partners that under each
state’s UPA both women are mothers of the children they planned for and
raised together. The Kansas ruling is especially significant. Kansas offers no
relationship recognition for same-sex couples; it does not prohibit employment
and other discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; it has not granted
222
second-parent adoptions. In other words, it is not a state with a favorable
213. Id. at 667.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 670, 669.
216. Id. at 669.
217. See Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 215 (Ct. App. 1991). Courts have used this
analysis to confer parentage on both mothers in numerous California cases. See In re Domestic
Partnership of C.P. and D.F., No. E052672, 2013 WL 2099156 (Cal. Ct. App. May 16, 2013); Beth C. v.
Marcia B., No. B233825, 2013 WL 143543 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2013); L.M. v. M.G., 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d
97 (Ct. App. 2012); E.C. v. J.V., 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 339 (Ct. App. 2012); Charisma R. v. Christian S., 44
Cal. Rptr. 3d 332 (Ct. App. 2006).
218. See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215. It was a Boulder, Colorado attorney, Barbara Lavender,
who in the late 1990s first successfully used these provisions of the UPA to obtain parentage for both
women in a lesbian couple bearing a child through donor insemination. The clients she represented
obtained parentage judgments from a trial judge which resulted in a new birth certificate listing both
women as parents. For an article describing Lavender’s success, see Pam Regsenberg, Gay Groups
Cheer Ruling, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, Sept. 8, 2000, available at http://www.barbaralavender.com/
articles_gaygroupscheer.htm.
219. The Colorado ruling came at the trial level. See Colleen Curry, Colorado Lesbian Wendy
Alfredson Mom Granted Paternity in Custody Battle, ABC NEWS (May 4, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/
US/colorado-lesbian-mom-wendy-alfredsen-granted-paternity-custody/story?id=16280117. Precedent
for that ruling was an appellate case finding parentage for the nonbiological mother married to a child’s
biological father. See In re S.N.V., 284 P.3d 147, 148 (Colo. App. 2011).
220. Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283, 285 (N.M. 2012).
221. Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 558 (Kan. 2013).
222. See State Profile – Kansas, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/
equality-maps/profile_state/KS (last updated May 15, 2014).
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climate for LGBT families. Nonetheless, it has parentage statutes that allowed a
unanimous three-judge panel of its Supreme Court to find the standards for
223
determining paternity applicable to determinations of maternity. As a result,
children raised by same-sex couples in Kansas are not going to lose one of their
parents if those parents split up.
A handful of other states have legal authorities that support identical
224
reasoning. The necessary components for success under this theory are (1) a
statutory presumption of paternity based on holding a child out as one’s own,
(2) case law that lack of genetic connection to the child does not automatically
rebut that presumption, and (3) statutory direction to apply the rules for
determining paternity to determinations of maternity. Those three components
mean that a woman who meets the holding-out requirement is a presumed
mother and her lack of genetic connection to the child does not rebut that.
Alabama is an example of a state with these necessary components. Like
Kansas, Alabama provides no recognition of same-sex couples and no
225
protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In
addition, it has a series of court rulings denying custody to a lesbian mother
226
when challenged by a former husband. Nonetheless, it should find that both
women who plan for and raise a child together are parents of that child.
Under Alabama law, a man is presumed a child’s father if he “receives the
child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child or
otherwise openly holds out the child as his natural child and establishes a
significant parental relationship with the child by providing emotional and
227
financial support.” The Code also states that “[p]rovisions of this chapter
228
relating to determinations of paternity apply to determinations of maternity.”
And just last year the Alabama Supreme Court provided strong support for the
holding-out presumption and ruled that a man’s lack of genetic connection to a
229
child is not a basis for rebutting that presumption.

223. Frazier, 295 P.3d at 553.
224. Some states have enacted the 2002 UPA rather than the 1973 UPA. The 2002 UPA, without
changing substance, rephrases the language on applying paternity presumptions to determinations of
maternity as follows: “Provisions of this [Act] relating to determination of paternity apply to
determinations of maternity.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 106 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 19–20 (Supp.
2010) (alterations in original). The holding-out provision has been substantively changed to apply only
where the parent and child have lived together for child’s first two years. Specifically, a man is
presumed to be a child’s father if “for the first two years of the child’s life, he resided in the same
household with the child and openly held out the child as his own.” Id. § 204(a)(5).
225. See State Profile – Alabama, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/
equality-maps/profile_state/AL (last updated May 15, 2014).
226. See, e.g., Ex parte J.B.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1191 (Ala. 1998); L.A.M. v. B.M., 906 So. 2d 942, 947
(Ala. Civ. App. 2004).
227. ALA. CODE § 26-17-204(a)(5) (2009).
228. Id. § 26-17-106.
229. Ex parte T.J., 89 So. 3d 774, 748 (Ala. 2012).
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In Ex parte T.J., a maternal grandmother filed a petition for custody of three
230
grandchildren. The following month, T.J. filed a petition for custody of one of
the children, alleging that the child had lived with him since her birth and that
231
he was her father. Subsequently, the mother filed both a custody petition and
232
She submitted evidence that T.J. was
a motion for genetic testing.
incarcerated when she became pregnant and that she was five-months pregnant
233
was he was released from prison.
The trial court found that T.J. had established a parent–child relationship
with the child, that the child called T.J. “daddy,” that the mother allowed that
relationship to grow, and that T.J. had provided for the child emotionally and
234
financially. Nonetheless, the judge granted the mother’s motion for genetic
235
testing, and T.J. sought a writ of mandamus to vacate the order.
In reasoning similar to that in Nicholas H., the Alabama Supreme Court
sided with T.J. T.J. was entitled to submit evidence that he was the child’s
236
presumed father under the holding-out provision. The statute provided that
when there were two or more presumptions, the one “founded on the weightier
237
considerations of public policy and logic . . . shall control.” The legislature
would not have adopted such a provision, the court ruled, if only a biological
238
father could be a presumed father. The court continued that “biological ties
are not as important as parent-child relationships that give young children
239
emotional stability.” It cited a 1989 case denying an alleged biological father
the right to challenge the presumption of paternity accorded the husband of the
240
child’s mother.
Although that case involved the marital presumption, Ex
parte T.J. explicitly extended the same principle to a man presumed to be the
241
father under the holding-out provision.
The court further cited with approval the reasoning of the dissenting judge
in the lower appellate court. That judge determined that the paternity
presumption applied to
a man who openly treats a child in the same manner he would treat his biological
child, who openly treats a child in accordance with the way that a father would treat

230. Id. at 745.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 746.
234. Id. at 750–51 (Murdock, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 746 (majority opinion).
236. Id. at 747.
237. Id. (quoting ALA. CODE § 26-17-204(b) (2009)).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. (citing Ex Parte Presse, 554 So. 2d 406 (Ala. 1989)). The constitutionality of a California
statute that denied a biological father the ability to file a parentage action concerning a child born to a
woman who was married to another man at the time of the child’s conception and birth, when the
woman and her husband wished to raise the child as their own, was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court
in a plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
241. Ex parte T.J., 89 So. 3d at 748.
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his biological child, or who openly treats the child as if the child had assumed the role
of his biological child ‘and establishes a significant parental242relationship with the child
by providing emotional and financial support for the child.’

“Read in this way,” that judge continued, “[the statute] serves to promote a
243
significant parental relationship over a mere biological connection.” Because
of the provision applying rules for paternity determinations to determinations
of maternity, biology is therefore not a necessary component for determining
that a woman is a child’s mother.
C. Troxel Does Not Bar the Finding that a Child Has Two Mothers
In every instance where a court has found a legal basis to rule that both
women are the parents of the children, the court has simultaneously rebuffed an
argument that Troxel insulates the biological or adoptive mother from a
244
challenge by her former partner. Rather, every court has ruled that Troxel
extends constitutional protection to both women, because both are the child’s
245
parents. For example, in Smith v. Guest, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of a statute defining parentage to include a de facto parent
meeting specific criteria:
The issue here is not whether the Family Court has infringed Smith’s fundamental
parental right to control who has access to ANS by awarding Guest co-equal parental
status. Rather, the issue is whether Guest is a legal “parent” of ANS who would also
have parental rights to ANS—rights that are co-equal to Smith’s. This is not a case,
like Troxel, where a third party having no claim to a parent-child relationship (e.g., the
child’s grandparents) seeks visitation rights . . . . Because Guest, as a legal parent,
would have a co-equal “fundamental parental interest” in raising ANS, allowing Guest
to pursue that interest through a legally-recognized
channel cannot unconstitutionally
246
infringe Smith’s due-process rights.

V
CONCLUSION: FINAL THOUGHTS ON THE APPLICABILITY OF MNOOKIN’S
PRINCIPLES
Mnookin valued family autonomy and continuity and stability in
247
relationships. Judges who have used family-autonomy arguments to rule
against nonbiological and nonadoptive parents have misidentified the family
before them. The family is the one created by the biological or adoptive parent
and her partner. Valuing family autonomy means taking that family as it is and
making appropriate decisions in the interests of the children. It violates the
principle of family autonomy to reconfigure a family with two parents raising
242. Id. at 748–49.
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 49–52 (Ct. App. 2009) (finding an
analogy to Troxel “inapposite” because of the different interests asserted by the plaintiff in the
immediate case); In re L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 177 (Wash. 2005) (en banc) (rejecting the suggestion that
granting de facto–parent status violated the biological mother’s constitutional rights).
245. 16 A.3d 920, 924 (Del. 2011).
246. Id. at 931.
247. Mnookin, supra note 1, at 264–65.
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children into a single-parent family with a live-in third party. As discussed in
this article, numerous courts have recognized this.
The importance of stability and continuity is precisely the principle that
demands that the law recognize the reality of the child’s perspective on his or
her family. In 1975, the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit articulation of
248
psychological parentage was relatively new. Today it is a widely understood
concept. Mnookin supported the best-interests standard “between two natural
parents, neither of whom would endanger a child’s physical health, where both
249
are psychological parents.” He continued that “I do not think that existing
psychological theories provide the basis to choose generally between two adults
250
where the child has some relationship and psychological attachment to each.”
The families I describe in this article contain one or more children who
regard the couple raising them as their parents, and specifically their
psychological parents. Several courts have identified both adults as parents,
through common-law adjudication, constitutional analysis, or recognition that
the term “natural parent” in a statute is not limited to biological parents,
251
something with which I hope Mnookin would agree today. Other states have
implemented statutory reforms that achieve the same result. The postseparation
custody arrangements for such children should be decided using best-interests
252
principles.

248. See GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 6, at 17–20.
249. Mnookin, supra note 1, at 283.
250. Id. at 286–87.
251. See Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2014 at 249, 264–66.
252. Because I argue here that the children in the factual scenarios in this article have two parents, I
leave for another day other critical questions arising from modern family structures, including whether
a child may have more than two parents and when someone who is not a parent, in other words a true
third party, should have the ability to demand court-ordered contact with a child. For an early germinal
work on the latter subject, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The
Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879
(1984). That article could properly be the subject of its own thirty-years-later symposium.

